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Abstract
Defence organisations perform information security
evaluations to confirm that electronic communica-
tions devices are safe to use in security-critical sit-
uations. Such evaluations include tracing all possible
dataflow paths through the device, but this process
is tedious and error-prone, so automated reachabil-
ity analysis tools are needed to make security eval-
uations faster and more accurate. Previous research
has produced a tool, Sifa, for dataflow analysis of
basic digital circuitry, but it cannot analyse data-
flow through microprocessors embedded within the
circuit since this depends on the software they run.
We have developed a static analysis tool that pro-
duces Sifa-compatible dataflow graphs from embed-
ded microcontroller programs written in C. In this
paper we present a case study which shows how this
new capability supports combined hardware and soft-
ware dataflow analyses of a security-critical commu-
nications device.
Keywords: Information security evaluation; Dataflow
analysis; Static analysis; Embedded devices
1 Introduction
Security-critical communications devices used to safe-
guard data confidentiality and integrity in govern-
ment, military and industrial applications must be
rigorously evaluated before they are deployed. Typ-
ical ‘domain separation’ devices used to control the
flow of information between classified and unclassified
communications networks include data diodes (which
enforce unidirectional information flow), encryption
devices (which allow classified data to be sent over
insecure networks), trusted filters (which constrict in-
formation flow) and keyboard-video-mouse switches
(which allow a single workstation to access both high-
security and low-security computers).
International standards, such as the Common Cri-
teria for Information Technology Security Evalua-
tion (ISO 2009), mandate information security, or
‘infosec’, evaluations of such devices. For instance,
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within Australia the Defence Signals Directorate fol-
lows such standards to produce a list of trustworthy
devices, known as the Evaluated Products List1.
A particularly challenging aspect of ‘high-grade’
infosec evaluations is to trace all (potential) dataflow
paths through the device. With respect to the de-
vice’s electronic circuitry this process is notoriously
tedious and error-prone, but it becomes virtually im-
possible when embedded microprocessors are encoun-
tered on the circuit board. The number of dataflow
paths through embedded program code far outweighs
the number of physical connections in the surround-
ing circuitry and, unlike a circuitry schematic dia-
gram, potential dataflow paths through software are
not self-evident from mere inspection of the source
code.
To help alleviate this problem we recently com-
pleted a static analyser (Fidge & Corney 2009) which
can extract dataflow graphs from Embedded C pro-
grams in a form compatible with an existing tool for
reachability analyses of digital circuitry (McComb &
Wildman 2005). The combination of these two tools
thus promises to support seamless automated analy-
ses of dataflow through both the electronic circuitry
and embedded software of security-critical communi-
cations devices.
In this paper we present a detailed case study
demonstrating for the first time how these tools can
be used together to analyse an actual domain separa-
tion device, tracing dataflow through both its hard-
ware architecture and embedded software. The device
itself is a testbed specifically intended for experimen-
tation with infosec evaluation processes. The analy-
sis produced all of the known dataflow paths through
this device, as well as revealing some that were not
anticipated.
2 Previous and related work
Overall our concern is with automated tools that can
help an information security evaluator understand the
(potential) flow of data through an electronic device,
including both its electronic circuitry and embedded
software.
There are, of course, numerous electronic circuit
simulators available as both educational and debug-
ging aids. These include Spice2, the Electric VLSI
Design System3 and NGSpice4. However these are
for modelling simple electronic components, semicon-
ductors and logic gates, not microcontroller software.
1http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/
2http://bwrc.eecs.berkeley.edu/classes/icbook/spice/
3http://www.staticfreesoft.com/
4http://ngspice.sourceforge.net/
There are also many multiprocessor simula-
tors such as PTLSim5 for the x86 microprocessor,
CASPER6 for the OpenSPARC T1, the SESC Su-
perESCalar Simulator7, and the IBM Full Systems
Simulator8 for the PowerPC processor, but these tools
generally focus on simulating a single processor at the
level of individual instruction cycles.
Much closer to our needs are simulators for entire
circuit boards, together with their embedded micro-
processors, including commercial tools such as Wind
River Simics9 and OVPSim10.
However, all of the above-cited tools are simula-
tors for helping a developer debug a device by exam-
ining one functional behaviour at a time. An info-
sec evaluator is instead faced with the problem of
analysing a given device which is presumed to be
functionally correct and does not need debugging.
Furthermore, a security evaluator needs to consider
all possible behaviours of the device, not just a few.
This requirement is best served not by a simulator
but by a static analyser which can explore all of the
device’s behaviours at once. Finally, none of the tools
cited above are designed specifically for security eval-
uations.
Much more useful for this purpose are tools that
treat security-critical circuitry as a graph which can
be analysed topologically. For instance, the Uni-
versal Virtual Laboratory includes a circuit analy-
sis module which can determine whether or not two
seemingly-different circuits are topologically equiv-
alent (Mahalingam, Butz & Duarte 2005). More
importantly, however, the Secure Information Flow
Analyser, Sifa, performs topological analyses of cir-
cuitry schematics specifically to support information
security evaluations (McComb & Wildman 2005).
We therefore used the Sifa tool as the starting
point for our own research; its capabilities are de-
scribed further in Section 3.1 below. In essence, the
goal of our overall project is to extend Sifa with the
ability to analyse embedded program code as well as
circuitry.
3 Dataflow analysis tools used
Before presenting the case study, this section briefly
describes both of the tools that were used, namely
the Secure Information Flow Analyser (McComb
& Wildman 2007) and our new C-to-Sifa Con-
verter (Fidge & Corney 2009).
3.1 The Secure Information Flow Analyser
Sifa, the Secure Information Flow Analyser, is an
open-source11 software tool developed for the Defence
Signals Directorate to assist with infosec evaluation of
electronic circuits (McComb & Wildman 2005). It in-
corporates a simple graph editor to allow device mod-
els to be constructed manually, but can also import
circuitry schematics expressed in the Vhdl hardware
design language.
Sifa represents electronic circuitry as a graph of
ports, which form the basis for its reachability anal-
yses (McComb & Wildman 2006). Typically ports
denote physical pins and connections on a circuit
board. Ports can be grouped to form components.
5http://www.ptlsim.org/
6http://coe.uncc.edu/∼kdatta/casper/casper.php
7http://iacoma.cs.uiuc.edu/∼paulsack/sescdoc/
8http://www.research.ibm.com/systemssim/
9http://www.windriver.com/products/simics/
10http://www.ovpworld.org/technology ovpsim.php
11http://sifa.sourceforge.net/
These usually represent discrete electronic compo-
nents on the board such as logic gates, integrated
circuit chips, connectors, etc. Sifa allows compo-
nents to be grouped hierarchically, thus providing
a highly flexible modelling capability. Furthermore,
Sifa treats all identically-named ports as denoting
the same physical object. This allows circuitry dia-
grams to be split horizontally into different ‘pages’,
with identically-named ports acting as off-page con-
nectors, or vertically into layered models, allowing the
same circuit to be described at different levels of ab-
straction simultaneously.
Sifa provides a variety of graph-theoretic func-
tions for analysing models of security-critical cir-
cuitry (McComb & Wildman 2007). These include
identifying all components between two points in the
graph (which helps exclude components that have
no security significance), finding cutsets between two
points (which helps identify places in the circuit where
infosec evaluations can be done most efficiently), and
comparing two different graphs for overall equivalence
(which allows an abstract model of expected data flow
to be compared with the actual data flow in the con-
crete circuit).
However, Sifa’s most important function is its
ability to identify all dataflow paths between selected
points in a graph, typically between a high-security
data source and a low-security data sink. Since a
circuitry graph is usually fully-connected (i.e., ev-
ery electronic component is connected directly or in-
directly to every other one), Sifa uses the concept
of a device’s operating modes to allow such graphs
to be partitioned meaningfully. The user can define
intra-component data flow with respect to particu-
lar modes. Modes are further divided into normal
and ‘fault’ behaviours, with a probability attached
to the latter. (Sifa has no semantic understanding
of modes, however, using them merely as a syntactic
way of partitioning the search space.)
Sifa thus performs a mode-specific analysis of
inter-component reachability and presents the user
with a list of those paths through the circuit that
connect selected data sources and sinks in particular
modes. The infosec evaluator can then inspect each
such path to determine whether or not it poses a se-
curity risk. While adequate for circuits comprised
of simple electronic components only, this process
encounters difficulties coping with the complex be-
haviours of embedded microprocesors. The infosec
evaluator is obliged to separately analyse the program
code to determine how data may flow through these
components.
3.2 The C-to-SIFA Converter
To solve this problem, we recently completed a ‘C-
to-Sifa Converter’. This is a compiler-like program
that converts Embedded C code to Sifa-compatible
dataflow graphs capable of being integrated into hard-
ware circuitry models. Its input consists of computer
programs written in Custom Computer Services’ C
dialect for Programmable Integrated Circuit micro-
controllers12, and its output is an XML description
of a dataflow graph that can be loaded directly into
Sifa. A preliminary description of the principles un-
derlying the tool can be found elsewhere (Fidge &
Corney 2009), with a more detailed description of the
final implementation to appear in a forthcoming pa-
per.
To model (potential) data flow through program
code the tool uses the Augmented Static Single
12http://www.ccsinfo.com/
if (u > 0) {
t = t + v;
} else {
t = w;
}
Figure 1: Example of a conditional statement.
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Figure 2: Dataflow graph generated by the C-to-Sifa
Converter for the code fragment in Figure 1.
Assignment representation, originally developed for
performing ‘taint analyses’ of security-critical pro-
grams (Scholz, Zhang & Cifuentes 2008). In partic-
ular, this representation considers not just explicit
data flow between program variables, but also the
implicit information flow created by one variable’s
value exercising control over assignments to another
variable (Sabelfeld & Myers 2003). For instance,
given the C program fragment in Figure 1, the C-
to-Sifa Converter will produce the Augmented SSA
dataflow graph in Figure 2. As in traditional data-
flow graphs (Cytron, Ferrante, Rosen, Wegman &
Zadeck 1989) it uses a ‘φ’ node to merge alternative
dataflow paths through the if statement, in this case
showing that variable t’s final value (t2) may be de-
rived either from the initial values of variables t and v
or from variable w. In addition, however, the Aug-
mented SSA graph also shows relevant control flows,
in the same way as Gated Single Assignment repre-
sentation (Ballance, Maccabe & Ottenstein 1990), in
this case showing that variable u’s value exercises con-
trol over the final value of variable t.
Apart from implementing the basic conversion
from imperative programming code to dataflow
graphs, we also needed to extend the analysis to han-
dle program constructs peculiar to embedded code.
These included input and output statements that in-
teract directly with the surrounding hardware, low-
level, non-block structured control-flow statements
such as breaks and continues, asynchronous control
flow via hardware interrupts, and byte- and bit-level
data operations.
The case study described below also highlighted
some practical issues that needed to be solved within
the C-to-Sifa Converter. For instance, since the de-
vice analysed contains two separate microcontrollers
it was necessary to uniquely distinguish the data-
flow nodes generated for each of the two embedded
programs (because Sifa unifies all identically-named
nodes) via a command-line option for prefixing the
names of graph nodes with a microcontroller-specific
identifer. Also, the large number of dataflow nodes
generated for program code relative to its surround-
ing circuitry makes it difficult to interpret the long
dataflow paths generated by Sifa, so the source code
program’s line number is included in the name of each
dataflow graph node generated.
Most significantly, the user needs a way to link the
microcontroller pins appearing in the circuitry dia-
gram to corresponding input and output statements
in the program code (Fidge & Corney 2009). A vari-
ety of potential solutions to this were contemplated,
such as adding a ‘bridging’ component to the Sifa
model to explicitly link hardware and software fea-
tures, or providing a configuration file to the C-to-
Sifa Converter to tell it what names are used for the
microcontroller’s pins in the hardware schematic. For
the purposes of this particular case study, however,
it was found to be expedient to simply directly edit
the pin names in the (hand-crafted) hardware model
to match those in the (automatically-generated) soft-
ware model, especially since only a handful of the
many pins on the microprocessor chips were used to
transfer data.
4 The case study
To test the combined capabilities of Sifa and the C-
to-Sifa Converter we performed a small, but com-
plete, case study to show how potential data flow can
be traced through both the hardware and software of
an embedded domain-separation device.
4.1 The data diode device
The subject of the trial was a ‘data diode device’ pro-
duced by Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate13 as
an unclassified and non-proprietary testbed for exper-
imenting with infosec evaluation techniques (Mallen
2003). Our project team was given access to the de-
vice’s design drawings, circuitry schematics and code
listings, as well as a functional version of the device
itself. A data diode device is typically used as part
of a gateway between a high-security network and a
low-security one, in order to ensure that there is no
information leakage from the former to the latter.
The particular data diode device analysed
here (Mallen 2003) contains two circuit boards con-
nected by a ribbon cable as shown in Figure 3. The
‘red’ circuit board is connected to the high-security
network via an RS232 serial cable and the ‘black’ cir-
cuit board is similarly connected to the low-security
network. (This split architecture is intended to aid
security evaluation of the device; high-security data
should be found on the red circuit board only and
the ribbon cable forms a narrow, well-defined bottle-
neck between the two security domains.) Both circuit
boards contain their own Programmable Integrated
Circuit microcontroller each running a different pro-
gram written in Custom Computer Services’ C di-
alect. Both microcontrollers directly control LEDs on
the device’s front panel to display its communication
status (‘ready for data’ or ‘waiting for acknowledge-
ment’). Two switches on the front panel (‘reset’ and
‘ack mode’) are connected directly to the black micro-
controller, and indirectly through the ribbon cable to
13http://www.dsd.gov.au/
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Figure 3: Block architecture of the data diode device.
the red microcontroller, to allow the operator to con-
trol the device’s operating mode.
The data diode device’s primary function is to al-
low data bytes to flow from the low-security network
to the high-security one (i.e., from left to right in Fig-
ure 3) but not vice versa. However, to support com-
munication over unreliable networks, this particular
device also allows acknowledgements to be returned
from the high-security network to the low-security one
(i.e., from right to left in Figure 3). Such a capabil-
ity is, of course, clearly dangerous because it allows
information to flow from the high-security domain to
the low-security one.
To (partially) mitigate this threat, the acknowl-
edgement function is directly controlled by the op-
erator via a front panel switch. Furthermore, entire
bytes returned by the high-security network are not
directly forwarded to the low-security one. Instead,
the red microprocessor compares the returned byte
with the one just sent. Depending on whether or not
they match it sets one of two binary signals sent to the
black microprocessor. Finally, the black microproc-
essor converts these signals into one of two characters
(‘Y’ or ‘N’) returned to the low-security network, thus
constricting (but not entirely eliminating) the flow of
information in the unsafe direction.
Overall, therefore, this data diode device offers an
ideal testbed for infosec evaluation procedures since
it has both a well-defined safe behaviour (the black-
to-red data path) and a potentially unsafe behaviour
(the red-to-black acknowledgement path).
4.2 Modelling and analysis process for the
case study
To perform the analysis a model of the data diode
device’s hardware layout was first developed using
Sifa’s built-in editor, as shown in Figure 4. No Vhdl
representation of the circuitry was available, so the
model was constructed manually, but this was not
a major problem since this device’s hardware is rel-
atively simple; the black circuit board’s model con-
tained nine distinct components and the red board’s
model contained eight. (As is usual in these evalu-
ations, power circuitry components, such as capac-
itors and resistors, were not modelled.) Appropri-
ate mode-specific connectivity through each of these
components, except for the microcontrollers, was de-
fined for the two main operating modes of the data
diode device, namely ‘ack mode on’ and ‘ack mode
off’. (Another advantage of the data diode device as
a testbed is that its significant operating modes are
obvious in its design.)
Next, the source code programs for the two micro-
controllers were processed by the C-to-Sifa Con-
verter. (Both programs are written in the Embedded
C dialect for the PIC16F877 microcontrollers used in
the data diode device.) Although the programs be-
ing analysed were quite small, the resulting dataflow
graphs were still highly complex. The ‘black’ pro-
gram consisted of only 106 lines of commented, for-
matted C code, plus a 248 line header file, but re-
sulted in a graph containing 195 Sifa ports grouped
to form 87 dataflow graph components. Similarly,
the red program’s 109 lines, plus header file, gener-
ated 200 ports forming 89 dataflow components. Part
of these graphs is shown in Figure 5. (Sifa does not
have an in-built graph layout tool, and the C-to-Sifa
Converter merely generates nodes in a simple grid,
without giving consideration to layout issues such as
minimising line cross-overs. Fortunately, the infosec
evaluator will not normally be obliged to study these
graphs, relying merely on the output from the analy-
sis, unless an exceptionally-detailed understanding of
a particular dataflow path is required.)
It was then possible to load both the hardware
and software models into Sifa, select source and sink
nodes, and automatically analyse the model to find
dataflow paths of potential security signficance. A
variety of analyses were performed to ensure that all
the dataflow pathways anticipated for this device were
detected by the combined hardware-software model.
Several of the paths returned by Sifa were then hand-
checked in order to ensure that they conformed with
our understanding of the way the device processes
and forwards data. Doing this confirmed that the en-
tire toolchain was working correctly and also helped
us understand some unexpected, but logically ‘cor-
rect’, false-positive paths produced. (Inevitably a
static analysis such as that performed by Sifa will to
some extent overapproximate the actual paths that
occur dynamically. While we can seek to minimise
such false-positives, their existence is a fundamental
limitation of static analyses.)
Figure 4: Models of the data diode’s black and red circuit boards in Sifa’s editing window.
5 Dataflow analysis results
Having completed the hardware and software models
a number of dataflow analyses were performed to test
the combined capabilities of the existing Sifa tool and
our new C-to-Sifa Converter.
5.1 An explicit dataflow path
As an initial test we selected the incoming line of the
data diode device’s black serial connector as the data
source of interest and the outgoing line of the red
serial connector as the data sink, in order to iden-
tify (safe) dataflow paths from the low-security net-
work to the high-security network via the data diode.
As expected, Sifa reported the existence of one such
path. This path, which comprised 20 distinct steps,
represents the ‘normal’ flow of data bytes through the
device.
Such paths are essentially just a list of ports, but
to make them easier to interpret Sifa’s interactive
interface allows the user to single-step through the
trace, automatically highlighting corresponding com-
ponents in the graph and the operating modes in
which they can be traversed. Doing this for the path
found in this case allowed us to see how data can
travel from the black network to the red one, via
both hardware and software within the data diode
device, and relate this path back to the original cir-
cuitry schematics and code listings (Figures 6 to 9).
In this case, starting from the black serial port (on
the left of Figure 6), data bytes travel via the RS232
receiver component to pin A0 of the black micro-
controller. The microcontroller’s program (Figure 7)
reads these bytes into a local variable, inputChar,
and later sends them to pin A1. (The pins operated
on by the getc and putc statements are determined
by the preceding ‘#use’ compiler directive.) This is
66 if (getNextChar==TRUE) {
. . .
70 #use rs232(baud=9600,Xmit=PIN A1,
Rcv=PIN A0,parity=n,bits=8)
71 inputChar = getc();
72 // Disable ready LED
73 output low(PIN C7);
75 if (input(PIN c2)) {
76 // Set waiting for ack LED
77 output high(PIN C6);
78 lastC0 = input(PIN C0);
79 lastC1 = input(PIN C1);
80 }
81 putc(inputChar);
82 }
Figure 7: Program code (lines 71 and 81) that trans-
fers data from black microprocessor pin A0 to pin A1.
an example of direct data flow between hardware pins
and software variables via explicit assignments in the
program code, and demonstrates the C-to-Sifa Con-
verter’s ability to model these relationships.
From black microcontroller pin A1 the bytes travel
to the red circuit board via the ribbon cable (right-
hand side of Figure 6). On the red circuit board (left
of Figure 8) the bytes travel via an optocoupler (used
to ensure unidirectional data flow along this circuit)
and enter the red microcontroller via its A0 pin.
Similarly to the other embedded program, the red
microcontroller’s code (Figure 9) transfers data bytes
between its hardware pins A0 and A1 via an interme-
diate software variable, rxChar. From pin A1 each
byte is forwarded to the data diode device’s red serial
port via an RS232 driver (right-hand side of Figure 8).
Sifa’s identification of this expected data path
Figure 5: Part of the automatically-generated (and unformatted) model of data flow through the red micro-
processor’s software in Sifa’s editing window.
66 while (TRUE)
67 {
69 output high(PIN C7);
70 #use rs232(baud=9600,Xmit=PIN A1,
Rcv=PIN A0,parity=n,bits=8)
71 rxChar = getc();
72 putc(rxChar);
74 output low(PIN C7);
75 if (input(PIN C2)) {
76 . . .
Figure 9: Program code (lines 71 and 72) that trans-
fers data from red microprocessor pin A0 to pin A1.
helped confirm the correct functioning of the C-to-
Sifa Converter and demonstrates the ability to find
composite hardware-software dataflow paths created
by explicit data assignments.
5.2 Some implicit dataflow paths
More importantly, we then analysed the model us-
ing the data diode’s red serial connector as the data
source and its black connector as the sink, in order to
identify potentially unsafe data flows from the high-
security domain to the low-security one. Given the
obvious dangers associated with the data diode de-
vice’s acknowledgement function it was no surprise
that Sifa identified the existence of such a path, but
it was interesting to note that ten distinct high-to-low
paths were produced, the longest of which involved 46
steps from source to sink.
Upon investigation, it was discovered that this
large number of dataflow paths in the ‘reverse’ direc-
tion is due to the numerous conditional (‘if’) state-
ments in the part of the program code that processes
acknowledgements. For instance, both microcont-
rollers have program code that is conditional on the
position of the ‘ack mode’ switch on the data diode
device’s front panel. Also, the red microcontroller
executes different code depending on whether or not
the byte returned by the high-security network is the
same as the last byte sent to it. Similarly, the black
microcontroller’s program tests the values of both the
positive and negative acknowledgement signals gen-
erated by the red microprocessor and performs dif-
ferent actions accordingly. Putting all of these al-
ternative behaviours together accounts for the many
distinct dataflow paths found by Sifa. Furthermore,
the computational complexity involved in traversing
these paths accounts for their significant length.
For instance, one of the potentially dangerous
dataflow paths from the high-security domain to
the low-security one concerns negative acknowledge-
ments, produced when the data diode sends a byte to
the high-security network but a non-matching byte is
returned. Sifa’s analysis shows that this path starts
from the red serial port (on the right of Figure 10)
Figure 6: Data path (left to right) through the black circuit board via the black microprocessor.
Figure 8: Data path (left to right) through the red circuit board via the red microprocessor.
Figure 10: Control path (right to left) for negative acknowledgements through the red circuit board via the
red microprocessor.
and travels through the red processor board’s RS232
receiver and an AND gate before reaching pin A2 on
the red microcontroller. The AND gate (bottom cen-
tre of Figure 10) is connected to the ‘ack mode’ switch
on the data diode device’s front panel (via the black
circuit board) and is used to ensure that acknowledge-
ment data reaches the red microcontroller only when
the data diode device is in acknowledgement mode.
Sifa’s trace through the red microcontroller’s pro-
gram code for this particular path (Figure 11) shows
that the byte is read from hardware pin A2 into soft-
ware variable ackChar (line 88). Later this variable
is compared to the last byte sent to the high-security
domain (line 99), held in variable rxChar. If the val-
ues do not match then the binary signal produced by
microcontroller pin C1 is toggled to indicate a nega-
tive acknowledgement (line 104).
Notice in this code that there is no direct transfer
of data from pin A2 to pin C1. The byte received via
pin A2 influences the binary signal sent via pin C1,
but no values from the byte are forwarded directly.
This is, therefore, an example of implicit information
flow between software variables and hardware pins,
again confirming the C-to-Sifa Converter’s ability to
capture such system properties.
From red microcontroller pin C1 the signal then
travels directly via the ribbon cable (left of Figure 10)
to pin C1 of the black microcontroller (from the right
in Figure 12).
The black microcontroller’s program code repeat-
edly samples the signal on this pin to see if it has
changed, in which case it sends a negative acknowl-
edgement character ‘N’ to the low-security network.
These multiple samples account for some of the dif-
ferent dataflow paths found by Sifa. For instance, a
78 #use rs232(baud=9600,Xmit=PIN A1,
Rcv=PIN A2,parity=n,bits=8)
87 if (kbhit()) {
88 ackChar = getc();
89 } else {
90 timeout error = TRUE;
91 }
93 output low(PIN C6);
95 if (timeout error) {
96 noAck = !noAck;
97 output bit(PIN C1, noAck);
98 } else {
99 if ( ackChar == rxChar) {
100 yesAck = !yesAck;
101 output bit(PIN C0, yesAck);
102 } else {
103 noAck = !noAck;
104 output bit(PIN C1, noAck);
105 }
106 }
Figure 11: Data-flow path (lines 88, 99 and 104)
through the red microprocessor’s code that translates
data received from pin A2 into a ‘negative acknowl-
edgement’ control signal sent via pin C1.
short path through the black microcontroller’s code
(Figure 13) occurs when the signal sampled from
pin C1 (line 92) is used in a condition which di-
rectly controls whether or not the ‘N’ character is sent
(line 95).
However, since the sampled signal is compared
with a previous sample from the same pin, a longer
Figure 12: Control path (right to left) for negative acknowledgements through the black circuit board via the
black microprocessor.
75 if (input(PIN c2)) {
77 output high(PIN C6);
78 lastC0 = input(PIN C0);
79 lastC1 = input(PIN C1);
80 }
81 . . .
84 if (input(PIN C2)) {
85 if (input(PIN C0) != lastC0) {
86 . . .
91 }
92 if ( input(PIN C1) != lastC1 ) {
93 if (!getNextChar) {
94 #use rs232(baud=9600,
Xmit=PIN A2,
Rcv=PIN A0,parity=n,bits=8)
95 putc(’N’);
96 getNextChar = TRUE;
97 output low(PIN C6);
98 }
99 lastC1 = input(PIN C1);
100 }
101 }
Figure 13: Two data-flow paths (lines 92 (left) and 95,
and lines 79, 92 (right) and 95) through the black
microprocessor’s code that translate a control signal
received from pin C1 into a ‘negative acknowledge-
ment’ data value sent via pin A2.
path that ends at the same output statement begins
by sampling a previous value from pin C1 (line 79)
into a software variable, lastC1, which is then com-
pared with the current sample (line 92), thus also
influencing whether or not the negative acknowlege-
ment character is sent (line 95). Such alternative
paths, due to conditional statements in the program
code, were found to account for the many different
high-to-low dataflow paths detected. Depending on
the rigour of the security evaluation, the infosec evalu-
ator may care to study each such path individually or
may simply note the existence of potential data flow
between the relevant microprocessor pins, regardless
of its specific cause.
Finally, the acknowledgement character sent from
the black microcontroller via its pin C1 reaches the
black network via another AND gate (bottom left of
Figure 12) and the black processor board’s RS232
driver.
Paths such as this one, plus the various others pro-
duced in this case, again confirm the toolchain’s abil-
ity to automatically identify complex dataflow paths
which may be worthy of close scrutiny.
5.3 Some less obvious paths
Apart from the crucial paths between the data diode
device’s red and black serial ports, we also explored
our toolchain’s ability to identify other paths both
within and through the device. In particular, we
analysed the potential destinations of data emanat-
ing from the switches on the device’s front panel, and
possible sources of signals driving the front panel’s
LEDs. In practice the device itself would normally
reside physically within a high-security domain, so
there is no serious danger of an adversary receiving a
coded message via the LEDs. However, the position
of the switches could conceivably be detectable by an
observer in the low-security domain, representing a
more realistic threat.
For instance, Sifa’s analysis, using our hardware
model and the software model generated by the C-to-
Sifa Converter, revealed 14 distinct dataflow paths
from the ‘ack mode’ switch on the data diode de-
vice’s front panel to the low-security serial port. As
was the case for the acknowledgement bytes described
above, this large number of paths proved to be due
to the numerous conditional statements in the micro-
controllers’ programs that rely on the position of this
switch. In essence, of course, the existence of these
68 output high(PIN C7);
69 getNextChar = FALSE;
70 #use rs232(baud=9600,Xmit=PIN A1,
Rcv=PIN A0,parity=n,bits=8)
71 inputChar = getc();
73 output low(PIN C7);
Figure 14: Part of the black microprocessor’s code re-
sponsible for reading data bytes (line 71) and flashing
the ‘ready to receive data’ LED (lines 68 and 73).
paths simply confirms the obvious fact that an ob-
server in the low-security domain can determine the
position of the (high-security) ‘ack’ switch merely by
noting the presence or absence of acknowledgements
coming from the data diode device in response to
bytes sent to it.
We also found numerous dataflow paths from the
‘ack mode’ switch to the two ‘waiting for ack’ LEDs
on the data diode device’s front panel (one LED is
attached to each circuit board). This is to be ex-
pected because the position of this switch determines
whether or not signals are sent to these LEDs. How-
ever, there were no paths from this switch to the
‘ready to receive data’ LEDs. Similarly, no paths
were found leading from the red serial port to the
‘ready to receive data’ LED on the red circuit board
since this port only receives acknowledgements, not
data bytes. These results conformed precisely with
our understanding of the data diode device’s internal
behaviour.
Some of the results were not so obvious, however.
For instance, we were surprised to discover that the
combined hardware-software analysis produced paths
leading from the red serial port, which receives ac-
knowledgement bytes only, to the ‘ready to receive
data’ LED attached to the black circuit board, which
displays the status of data bytes travelling in the op-
posite direction! Inspection of the black microcont-
roller’s program code revealed that this interaction is
due to the acknowledgement signals received by the
black microcontroller from the red one controlling as-
signments to a software variable, getNextChar, which
in turn is used to control code that sends signals to
this LED (via black microcontroller pin C6). This was
a good example of the C-to-Sifa Converter identify-
ing paths not expected by the research team. (Fur-
thermore, it was noted that the program code could
be restructured to eliminate this flow, although in
practice it does not represent a serious security threat
given the assumption that the LEDs are accessible in
the high-security domain only.)
A particularly counterintuitive finding was that
no dataflow paths were produced from the black se-
rial port to the black circuit board’s ‘ready to re-
ceive data’ LED, which flashes once for each data
byte received. The relevant part of the black micro-
controller’s program is shown in Figure 14. The
LED is first switched on (line 68), the data byte
is read (line 71), and the LED is then switched off
(line 73). However, despite the clearly-evident se-
quential relationship between execution of these three
statements, there is, in fact, no dataflow relationship
between them. The byte read from pin A0 into vari-
able inputChar is not sent to the LED connected to
pin C7. Nor does the byte received control the signals
sent to the LED; the same signals are sent to the LED
regardless of the value of the byte received. Thus the
C-to-Sifa Converter correctly produced no dataflow
connection between inputs on pin A0 and outputs to
pin C7 in this case. This is in accordance with the
well-established principle of noninterference as a fun-
damental way of modelling information flow (Goguen
& Meseguer 1982). There is, however, a timing rela-
tionship between these actions because the ‘low’ sig-
nal cannot be sent to pin C7 until the byte from
pin A0 has been read. A ‘timing channel’ thus ex-
ists between these pins, but our toolchain does not
(currently) attempt to perform timing analyses.
A similar case of an expected path not being found
was from the red serial port, which receives acknowl-
edgement bytes from the high-security domain, to
the ‘waiting for ack’ LED attached to the red circuit
board, which flashes to indicate to the operator that
an acknowledgement is being processed. Again this
finding by Sifa and the C-to-Sifa Converter was vin-
dicated by manual inspection of the red microcont-
roller’s program code, which showed that the same
signals are always sent to flash this LED regardless
of the value of the acknowledgement byte received.
In fact, it is the position of the ‘ack mode’ switch
that influences the behaviour of this LED, not the
acknowledgement bytes themselves. Again there is
a timing relationship between these actions, but no
actual data flow.
6 Conclusion
One of the key steps during information security eval-
uations of communications devices is to trace all po-
tential data flow through the device’s circuitry and
embedded program code. We have created a toolchain
which automates this process by combining an exist-
ing circuitry analysis tool, Sifa, with a new analy-
sis tool for embedded program code, the C-to-Sifa
Converter. In this paper we have used a small, but
complete, case study to show how this toolchain al-
lows the flow of data to be traced seamlessly and
accurately through a security device’s hardware and
software. At the time of writing we are conducting
further case studies involving interrupt-driven micro-
controller programs.
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